UTAH BUSINESS INSURANCE COMPANY v. WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND : Brief of Appellee by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
2011
UTAH BUSINESS INSURANCE COMPANY v.
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND : Brief of
Appellee
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
James R. Black; Matthew J. Black; Counsel for Workers Compensation Fund.
Michael E. Dyer; Scott R. Taylor; Blackburn & Stoll; Counsel for Appellant Utah Business Insurance
Co.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, UTAH BUSINESS INSURANCE COMPANY v. WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND, No. 20110744.00 (Utah
Supreme Court, 2011).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/3135
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
WORKERS COMPENSATION 
FUND 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
UTAH BUSINESS INSURANCE 
COMPANY, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
RESPONSE BRIEF OF 
PLAINTD7F/APPELLEE 
WORKERS COMPENSATION 
FUND 
Supreme Court No. 20U0744-SC 
Trial Court No. 100914170 
RESPONSE BRIEF OF APPELLEE WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND, 
Appeal from Entry of Judgment by 
the Honorable Paul G. Maughan, Third District Court Judge 
Michael E. Dyer 
Scott R. Taylor 
BLACKBURN & STOLL, LC 
257 East 200 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Counsel for Appellant Utah Business 
Insurance Co. 
James R. Black, #0347 
Matthew J. Black, #12442 
JAMES R. BLACK, P.C. 
265 East 100 South, Suite 255 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)531-6737 
Counsel for Workers Compensation 
Fund 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
JAN 1 1 2012 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
WORKERS COMPENSATION ] 
FUND ] 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
UTAH BUSINESS INSURANCE ] 
COMPANY, ] 
Defendant/Appellant. ] 
> RESPONSE BRIEF OF 
) PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE 
) WORKERS COMPENSATION 
I FUND 
> Supreme Court No. 201-0744-SC 
} Trial Court No. 100914170 
RESPONSE BRIEF OF APPELLEE WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND, 
Appeal from Entry of Judgment by 
the Honorable Paul G. Maughan, Third District Court Judge 
Michael E. Dyer James R. Black, #0347 
Scott R. Taylor Matthew J. Black, # 12442 
BLACKBURN & STOLL, LC JAMES R. BLACK, P.C. 
257 East 200 South, Suite 200 265 East 100 South, Suite 255 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Counsel for Appellant Utah Business Telephone: (801)531 -673 7 
Insurance Co. Counsel for Workers Compensation 
Fund 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
i 
TABLE OF CONTENTS < 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iv 
STATEMENT OF THE JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT . . 1 
i 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 1 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 3 
- • • - • • • : , < 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 5 
Statement of the Nature of the Case and the Course of Proceedings 5 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 7 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 17 
ARGUMENT ! 20 
I. NO FURTHER EVIDENCE IS NECESSARY TO ESTABLISH THAT 
PIONEER'S UBIC POLICY WAS EFFECTIVE BEGINNING 
FEBRUARY 22, 2008 20 
A. UBIC and Pioneer Intended their 2008 Policy to Become Effective 
On February 22, 2008 20 
B. The Trial Court Correctly Disregarded Pioneer and UBIC's Post 
Complaint, Self Serving Claims of an Alleged Intent to Commence 
Their Policy on April 1, 2008, Rather than February 22, 2008 and 
Correctly Refused to Allow Any Further Discovery Pursuant to Rule 
56(f) on that Issue 24 
1. UBIC's Post-Complaint, Self Serving Statements Regarding 
Its Pioneer Contract Inception Date Under the Circumstances 
of this Case Is Not Clear and Convincing Evidence of Mutual 
Mistake of Fact 25 
-ii-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2. UBIC has Already Provided All Documentary Evidence 
Regarding Its 2008 Pioneer Policy and None of It Supports 
UBIC's Alleged Mistake of Fact Regarding the February 22, 
2008 Pioneer Policy Inception Date 30 
II. PUBLIC POLICY PRECLUDES POST ACCIDENT INCEPTION DATE 
REFORMATION OF WORKERS COMPENSATION INSURANCE 
POLICIES 32 
III. UBIC'S ORIGINAL 2008 PIONEER POLICY IS STILL ACTIVE 
PURSUANT TO SECTION UTAH CODE ANN. §34A-2-205 
RESULTING IN UBIC S CONTINUED LIABILITY FOR A PRO-RATA 
SHARE OF MR. ANTONE'S CLAIM 35 
IV. THE "TARGETED TENDER DOCTRINE" SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED 
TO THIS CASE NOR ADOPTED IN UTAH. IT IS CONTRARY TO 
PIONEER'S WCF AND UBIC CONTRACTS AND CONTRARY TO 
THE OVERARCHING PUBLIC POLICY OF THE WORKERS 
COMPENSATION ACT 38 
A. The "Targeted Tender" Doctrine is Inconsistent with 
Pioneer's WCF and UBIC Contracts that Require 
Immediate Tender of a Workers Compensation Claim 
Involving Injuries to the Employer's Insurance 
Companies 40 
B. UBIC Received Notice of Mr. Antone's Accident at the Time of the 
Accident by Function of Pioneer's UBIC Contract. Following that 
Notice, the Workers Compensation Act Requires UBIC's 
Participation in the Payment Benefits for Mr. Antone's Claim . . . 43 
C. WCF's Right to Equitable Contribution from UBIC on Mr. Antone's 
Claim is a Right Independent of Any Right of the Insured 
Pioneer 46 
V. WCF WAS A CO-INSURANCE CARRIER WITH UBIC COVERING 
PIONEER'S LIABILITY TO INJURED EMPLOYEE ANTONE 50 
CONCLUSION 51 
-iii-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES: 
American States Insurance Company v. National Fire Insurance Company of Hartford, 
Case No. D057673, Court of Appeals of California, Fourth District, Division One. Filed 
December 14, 2011 48 
Deseret National Bank v. Henry Dinwoody, 
53 P. 215 (Utah 1898) 26 
Dixon v. Pro-Image, Inc., 
987 P.2d 48 (Utah 1999) 40 
Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 
77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 296 (1998) 48 
Garff Realty Co. v. Better Buildings, Inc., 
234 P.2d 842 (Utah 1951) 21 
Hartford Casualty Ins. Co. v. Mt. Hawley Ins. Co. 
123 Cal. App. 4th 278 (2004) 47 
John Call Engineering v. Manti City Corporation, 
743 P.2d 1205 (Utah 1987) 21 
Johnson v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., 
818 P.2d 997 (Utah 1991) 24 
Louis L. Timm v. T. Lamar Dewsnup, 
921 P.2d 1381 (Utah 1996) . 2 5 
Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. Co. v. USF Ins. Co., 
191 P.3d 866 (Wash 2008) 48 
Nielsen v. O'Reilly, 
848 P.2d 664 (Utah 1993) . . . . 40 
Petersen v. Riverton City, 
243 P.3d 1261 (Utah 2010) 1, 2, 3 
-iv-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Reid D. Bench v. Erma Pace, 
538 P.2d 180 (Utah 1975) 26 
Rhone-Pulenc Inc. v. International Ins. Co., 
71 F.3d 1299 (7th Cir. 1995) 47 
Rick Warner Truckland v. Kurt F. Sirstins, 
838 P.2d 666 (Utah 1989) 21 
Sharon Steel Corporation v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, 
931 P.2d 127 (Utah 1997) 49 
Touchardv. La-Z-Boy, 
148 P.3d 945 (Utah 2006) 18, 33,34,46 
Underwriters at Lloyd's v. Massachusetts Bonding and Insurance Co., 
230 P.3d 103 (Ore. 2010) , 47 
Union Bank v. Swenson, 
707 P.2d 663 (Utah 1985) 20, 24 
Willard Pease Oil & Gas Co. v. Pioneer Oil & Gas Co., 
899 P.2d 766 (Utah 1995) 40 
STATUTES: 
Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-1001 3, 51 
Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-1002 3, 35, 37 
Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-1006 3, 43 
Utah Code Ann. §31A-33-lll 51 
Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-201 4 
Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-205 4, 17, 18, 35, 36, 37 
Utah Code Annotated §34A-2-401 5, 33, 34,44 
Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-407 33 
-v-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Utah Code Ann. §78A-3-102 1 
Utah Code Ann. §78B-6-401 et seq 5 
TREATISES: 
4 Bruner & O'Connor, Construction Law (2011) § 11:59 38, 48 
Aspen Publishers, Handbook On Insurance Coverage Disputes, 15th Edition 39 
-vi-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STATEMENT OF THE JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT 
This appeal was retained by the Supreme Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78A-
3-102. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
ISSUE 1: Did the trial court correctly grant Workers' Compensation Fund's Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment determining that Utah Business Insurance Company should equally 
share the liability for payment of the catastrophic worker's compensation claim of the employee 
of the employer both carriers insured? 
Standard of Review: A trial court's decision to grant a motion for summary 
judgment is a question of law that is reviewed for correctness, granting no deference to 
the trial court.1 
ISSUE 2: Should Workers Compensation Fund and Utah Business Insurance Company 
equally share the liability for payment and administration of a catastrophic loss claim made by 
the employee of their insured Pioneer Roofing? 
Standard of Review: A trial court's decision to grant a motion for summary 
judgment is a question of law that is reviewed for correctness, granting no deference to 
the trial court.2 
ISSUE 3: In the event of two workers' compensation insurance policies with overlapping 
1
 Petersen v. Riverton City, 243 P.3d 1261, 1264 (Utah 2010). 
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coverage periods, do identical "Other Insurance"3 provisions in the two policies require the 
insurance carriers to equally share the workers' compensation liability for catastrophic accidental 
injuries to the insured employer's employee which occurred during the period of overlap? 
Standard of Review: A trial court's decision to grants motion for summary 
judgment is a question of law that is reviewed for correctness, granting no deference to 
the trial court.4 
ISSUE 4: Should the court follow traditional written contract interpretive principles or 
should Utah adopt the small minority interpretive doctrine of "targeted tender" which gives the 
insured employer the right to disregard the "Other Insurance" clause in its workers' 
compensation insurance contracts? 
Standard of Review: A trial court's granting of summary judgment to not apply a 
novel legal theory that has never been applied to a workers compensation setting is a 
question of law that is reviewed for correctness, granting no deference to the trial court.5 
ISSUE 5: In the event of overlapping insurance coverages, should an employer be allowed 
to unilaterally choose to which of the two workers' compensation insurances it will tender a 
3Both policies contain the following: 
We will not pay more than our share of benefits and costs covered 
by this insurance and other insurance or self-insurance. Subject to 
any limits of liability that may apply, all shares will be equal until 
the loss is paid. If any insurance or self-insurance is exhausted, 
the shares of all remaining insurance will be equal until the loss is 
paid. 
"Petersen v. Riverton City, 243 P.3d 1261, 1264 (Utah 2010). 
5Id. 
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workers' compensation claim to the exclusion of liability for the carrier not chosen for the 
tender6? 
Standard of Review: A trial court's granting of summary judgment and refusal to 
adopt a novel legal theory that has never been applied to a workers compensation setting 
is a question of law that is reviewed for correctness, granting no deference to the trial 
court.7 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-1002. Duration of coverage: 
(1) Any insurer assuming a workers1 compensation risk shall carry it until the 
policy is canceled, either: 
(a) by agreement between the Division of Industrial Accidents in the Labor 
Commission, the insurer, and the employer; or 
(b) after: 
(i) notice by the insurer to the employer as provided in Section 
31A-21-303;and 
(ii) notice to the Division of Industrial Accidents in the Labor 
Commission as provided in Section 34A-2-205. 
(2) Subsection (1) does not affect the requirements of Section 31A-22-1001. 
Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-1006. Insurer's constructive knowledge: 
Every workers1 compensation policy or contract shall contain a provision that, as 
between the employee and the insurer, notice to or knowledge of the occurrence of the 
injury on the part of the employer is considered to be notice or knowledge to the insurer. 
This provision shall also state that the insurer is bound by and subject to the orders, 
findings, decisions, and awards rendered against the employer for the payment of 
compensation on account of compensable accidental injuries or occupational disease 
^Targeted Tender Doctrine" 
''Petersen v. Riverton City, 243 P.3d 1261, 1264 (Utah 2010). 
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disability. 
Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-201. Employers to secure workers' compensation benefits 
for employees - Methods: 
An employer shall secure the payment of workers' compensation benefits for its 
employees by: 
(1) insuring, and keeping insured, the payment of this compensation with the 
Workers1 Compensation Fund; 
(2) insuring, and keeping insured, the payment of this compensation with any stock 
corporation or mutual association authorized to transact the business of workers1 
compensation insurance in this state; or 
(3) obtaining approval from the division in accordance with Section 34A-2-201.5 
to pay direct compensation as a self-insured employer in the amount, in the 
manner, and when due as provided for in this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah 
Occupational Disease Act. 
Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-205(l)(a) - (c). Notification of workers* compensation 
insurance coverage to division - Cancellation requirements - Penalty for violation: 
(1) (a) An insurance carrier writing workers1 compensation insurance 
coverage in this state or for this state, regardless of the state in which the 
policy is written, shall file notification of that coverage with the division or 
the division's designee within 30 days after the inception date of the policy 
in the form prescribed by the division. 
(b) A policy described in Subsection (l)(a) is in effect from inception until 
canceled by filing with the division or the division's designee a notification 
of cancellation in the form prescribed by the division within ten days after 
the cancellation of a policy. 
(c) Failure to notify the division or its designee under Subsection (l)(b) 
results in the continued liability of the carrier until the date that notice of 
cancellation is received by the division or the division's designee. 
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Utah Code Annotated §34A-2-401(l)-(2). Compensation for industrial 
accidents to be paid: 
(1) An employee described in Section 34A-2-104 who is injured and the 
dependents of each such employee who is killed, by accident arising out of 
and in the course of the employee's employment, wherever such injury 
occurred, if the accident was not purposely self-inflicted, shall be paid: 
(a) compensation for loss sustained on account of the injury or death; 
(b) the amount provided in this chapter for: 
(i) medical, nurse, and hospital services; 
(ii) medicines; and 
(iii) in case of death, the amount of funeral expenses. 
(2) The responsibility for compensation and payment of medical, nursing, 
and hospital services and medicines, and funeral expenses provided under 
this chapter shall be: 
(a) on the employer and the employer's insurance carrier; and 
(b) not on the employee. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Statement of the Nature of the Case and the Course of Proceedings 
Appellee Workers Compensation Fund ("WCF") filed a complaint8 on August 5, 
2010 against Utah Business Insurance Company ("UBIC") for declaratory relief pursuant 
to the Utah Declaratory Judgments Act, Utah Code Ann. §§78B-6-401 et seq. WCF 
asked the trial court both in its Complaint and by Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
filed on March 11, 20119 to find the twin10 WCF and UBIC workers' insurance policies 
8R. 1-18. 
9R. 53-55. 
10Both insurance carriers use preprinted Utah Insurance Department approved 
insurance policies. The language and paragraph numbering in the two policies are 
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i 
insuring employer Pioneer Roofing Company ("Pioneer") were both in effect on the day 
Pioneer employee Russell Antone ("Antone") was catastrophically injured while in the 
course and scope of his employment. Consistent with its vision of duty to the Utah 
Workers Compensation Act ("the Act"), WCF initially assumed and has continued to pay 
benefits to injured worker Antone as required by the Act. The medical expenses paid to 
date exceed $2,000,000. UBIC has refused to participate in the adjustment and payment < 
Mr. Antone's benefits as called for by the Act and its contract with Pioneer. 
The coverage period for WCF's expiring Pioneer policy was from April 1, 2007 
through March 31, 200811. UBIC's policy was effective from February 22, 2008, 
through February 22, 200912. Mr. Antone's accident occurred on March 21, 2008, during 
the period of policy overlap. 
Utah law requires the application of the "Other Insurance" clauses in the 
overlapping contracts. The identical contract forms contain the following provision: , 
E. Other Insurance 
Wewillnot pay more than our share of benefits and costs 
covered by this insurance and other insurance or self- < 
insurance. Subject to any limits of liability that may apply, all 
shares will be equal until the loss is paid. If any insurance or 
self-insurance is exhausted, the shares of all remaining 
identical. The pre-approved forms use the language authored by the National Council of 
Compensation Insurance, the State of Utah's compensation rate-making contractor. 
n R.71 . 
12R. 76-77. 
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insurance will be equal until the loss is paid.n 
WCF asked the court to grant it a partial summary judgment determining the two 
insurance carriers are obligated to pay equal shares of the liability for Mr. Antone's 
injuries based on the overlapping coverage and as Pioneer had contracted with each 
carrier in the "other insurance" clauses. The trial court granted WCF's Motion on July 
26, 2011.14 UBIC filed its Notice of Appeal on August 16, 2011.15 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Russell Antone was catastrophically injured on March 21, 2008, when he 
fell through a skylight at a construction project while in the course and scope of his 
employment with Pioneer roofing.16 Mr. Antone is now a permanent resident in a 24 hour 
per day skilled nursing facility.17 
2. WCF has paid all medical expenses and weekly compensation benefits 
required by the Workers Compensation Act on Mr. Antone's claim. The total medical 
expenses paid to date exceed $2,000,000. 
3. Pioneer maintained concurrent and overlapping workers compensation 
insurance policies with both WCF and UBIC on the date of Mr. Antone's accident. Both 
l3R. 81-82 and R. 92. 
14R. 378-385. 
l5R. 386-396. 
16R.4, 58, 112. 
11
 Id. 
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4 
insurance carriers use preprinted Utah Insurance Department approved insurance policies. The 
language and paragraph numbering in the two policies are identical. The pre-approved forms use 
the language authored by the National Council of Compensation Insurance ("NCCI"), the State 
of Utah's compensation rate-making contractor.18 As a result, the language in Pioneer's WCF 
and UBIC policies are identical, including the "other insurance" clauses: 
We will not pay more than our share of benefits and costs covered by this 
insurance and other insurance or self insurance. Subject to any limits of 
liability that may apply, all shares will be equal until the loss is paid. If any 
insurance or self insurance is exhausted, the shares of all remaining 
insurance will be equal until the loss is paid.I9 » 
4. Pioneer's 2008 UBIC workers compensation contract clearly and 
unambiguously states more than 30 time its UBIC policy was effective beginning 
February 22, 2008.20 Every premium billing invoice provided to Pioneer by UBIC 
beginning with the February 2008 billing affirms the policy period runs from February 22, 
2008 to February 22, 2009.21 
5. UBIC billed, and Pioneer paid, monthly premium beginning February 22, 
2008. Those payments included the partial month of February 22, 2008 through February 
I 
18R. 56. (WCF discussed the source of the identical contract forms in its Memorandum in 
Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. UBIC assented to the statement without 
opposition.) 
,9R. 81-82 and R. 92 
20R. 203-231. 
21R. 234-247. 
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29, 2008 and all of March 2008.22 UBIC sent Pioneer a letter verifying February 22, 2008 
as the inception date. UBIC specifically requested payroll information for the dates 
February 22, 2008 through February 29, 2008. The letter also requested premium 
payment for the partial month of February 2008.23 
6. Pioneer reviewed its 2008 UBIC policy at the time of the policy's 
inception.24 Pioneer received and paid every premium billing invoice from February 2008 
to February 2009. Each billing identified the policy effective date of February 22, 
2008.25 Pioneer also paid premiums to WCF on its WCF policy for February 2008 and 
March 2008.26 
7. In February 2011, UBIC allegedly credited the premium back to Pioneer 
that it accepted three years earlier. That "credit" occurred after the Complaint was filed, 
after initial disclosures, after UBIC's response to WCF's initial discovery requests, and 
more than a year after UBIC was notified of the overlapping coverage issue by WCF.27 
8. It wasn't until after WCF filed its complaint that UBIC demonstrated any 
concern regarding Pioneer's overlapping policies. Only after WCF filed this lawsuit did 
22Id 
23R. 250-251. 
24R. 125-127. 
25R. 234-247. 
26R.254. 
27R. 271-272. 
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UBIC disavow the February 22, 2008 effective date of its 2008 Pioneer policy.28 
The following is a detailed chronology of additional facts and procedural history 
both before and after litigation commenced in this case that will assist the Court in 
determining the lack of merit of UBIC s appeal. (See also Attachments 1 and 2 for 
demonstrative exhibit time-lines of the pre and post complaint history of the case.) 
The Parties' Correspondence and Procedural History 
9. March 10,2010: WCF put UBIC on notice of the overlapping coverage by 
letter to UBIC's CFO Brad Simons.29 
10. March 30, 2010: UBIC responded through its counsel of record. UBIC 
requested, among other things: 
A copy of the WCF policy for the employer which MWS, per your 
letter, effective April 1, 2007 through March 31, 2008, including a 
copy of any and all riders, extensions, limitations, exclusions, etc., 
relating to the policy?0 
11. April 7, 2010. WCF responded to UBIC's March 30, 2010 letter. WCF 
provided complete copies of: (a) WCF's policy with John Stout/Pioneer roofing; (b) the 
Employer's First Report of [Antone's] Injury; (c) a current payment history; and (d) all 
medical records associated with the treatment of Mr. Antone for his March 21, 2008 
;R. 22-27, 122-123. 
>R. 271-272. 
>R. 275-276. 
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injury.31 In return, WCF also requested a copy of UBIC s 2008 Pioneer policy and all 
documentation that is a part of the policy.32 UBIC didn't respond. 
12. May 24, 2010: WCF wrote UBIC another letter stating33; 
On . . . May 10, 2010. I left you a telephone message . . . As of today, WCF 
has not received any verbal or written response . . . 
Please provide WCF with the requested material... by Friday, June 4, 
2010. If WCF does not hear from you by then we will assume you wish to 
litigate this matter. . . 
13. May 28,2010: UBIC requested an additional two weeks from June 4, 
2010, to respond.34 UBIC did not respond. 
14. August 5,2010: WCF filed the Complaint against UBIC, requesting the 
court to order UBIC to pay its 50% pro-rata share of the Antone claim. 
15. September 13,2010: WCF's Complaint was served on UBIC.35 
16. October 8,2010: More than three weeks after UBIC was served WCF's 
Complaint, non-party John Stout, Pioneer's owner, wrote a letter to UBIC. In that letter, 
Mr. Stout states he did "not want to get UBIC involved in [Mr. Antone's] claim."36 He 
3,R. 279-280. 
32Id. 
33R. 283. 
34R. 286. 
35R. 289-291. 
36R. 346. 
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i 
expressed no concern regarding his overlapping WCF and UBIC workers compensation 
I 
policies before evident post-Complaint contact by UBIC representatives. 
17. October 13,2010: UBIC filed its Answer to WCF's complaint.37 
18. December 3,2010: The parties exchanged their URCP 26(a) initial 
disclosures. UBIC did not describe any detail of its 2008 Pioneer UBIC policy in its 
disclosures or provide a copy of the policy.38 < 
19. December 16,2010: Approaching three years from the effective date of 
the UBIC contract, Mr. Stout sent another tardy letter to UBIC. In the letter Mr. Stout 
requested, for the first time, to have his 2008 UBIC policy revised to reflect a policy 
effective date following the Antone accident and the expiration of his WCF policy.39 This 
request was more than three months after WCF's complaint had been served, and quite 
apparently, after post-Complaint contact by one or more UBIC representatives. 
20. January 6,2011: WCF served its "First Set of Interrogatories and 
Requests for Production of Documents to Defendant." WCF again requested complete 
copies of all of UBIC s Pioneer policies.40 
21. January 19,2011: UBIC began the process of reforming Pioneer's 2008 
R. 22-27. 
5R. 40-45. 
>R. 347. 
}R. 294-298. 
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UBIC contract to change the effective date of the policy from the original date of 
February 22, 2008 to April 1, 2008.41 Again, this process began months after litigation 
began. 
22. February 16,2011: UBIC responded to WCF's January 6, 2011 
discovery requests.42 UBIC's president, Ron Nielsen verified by signature that the 
effective date of UBIC's Pioneer policy was February 22, 2008.43 UBIC's discovery 
responses included only parts of the 2008 Pioneer policy. It did not include a copy of the 
form that included the "other insurance" clause. 
23. February 17,2011: WCF's counsel wrote a letter to UBIC's counsel 
requesting that; 
. . . UBIC respond completely to WCF's request for a complete copy of the 
at issue UBIC Policy Number: WC320-00003222008A covering Pioneer 
Roofing including a copy of any and all riders, extensions, limitations, 
exclusions, etc., relating to the policy.44 
24. February 18,2011: On February 18,2011, one day after WCF requested 
a complete copy of UBIC's 2008 Pioneer policy and two days after UBIC president Ron 
Nielsen verified the February 22, 2008 effective date, UBIC issued a "reformed" Pioneer 
policy. The only policy "revision" was to change the effective date from February 22, 
41R. 301-303. 
42R. 306-314. 
43M 
44R. 317-319. 
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) 
2008 to April 1,2008.45 
25. February 22.2011: UBIC filed its "Supplemental Responses to 
Plaintiffs First Set of Requests for Production of Documents," which included a 
complete copy of Pioneer's 2008 UBIC policy.46 On this same date, UBIC affirmed 
"after an exhaustive search" that "all 2008 policy documents have been produced."47 
UBIC did not disclose the February 18, 2011 attempt to "reform" the effective date of the 
2008 contract. 
26. March 11. 2011: WCF filed its "Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
Regarding 'Other Insurance."'48 
27. March 28.2011: UBIC filed its "counter motion for Summary Judgment" 
and supporting memorandum.49 
28. March 28.2011: UBIC filed its "Third Supplemental Disclosures" in 
which, for the first time, it disclosed its reformation attempt dated one month earlier -
more than five months after the Complaint was filed.50 
R. 129-150. .,'-
'R. 204-231. 
'R. 323. 
!R. 53-55. 
'R. 97-99. 
}R. 129-150, 157. 
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From Utah Labor Commission Records 
The following reflects Utah Labor Commission Records: 
29. February 21. 2008: Pioneer was insured by WCF policy #1452208.51 
30. February 22.2008: Pioneer was insured by two workers compensation 
policies, WCF policy #1452208 and UBIC policy #WC32000003222008A.52 
31. March 21,2008: Mr. Antone was injured. Pioneer was insured by two 
workers compensation policies, WCF policy #1452208 and UBIC policy 
#WC32000003222008A.53 
32. February 21.2009: Pioneer's UBIC policy #WC32000003222008A 
expired.54 
33. February 22,2009: Pioneer renewed its insurance coverage with UBIC. 
A new policy number was assigned: WC32000003222009A.55 This is exactly one year 
from the original policy effective date of February 22, 2008. 
34. February 21.2010: Pioneer's UBIC policy #WC32000003222009A 
expired.56 
5IR. 327. 
52R. 328-239. 
53R. 330-331. 
54R. 332. 
55R. 333. 
56R. 334. 
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35. February 22,2010: Pioneer's 2009 UBIC policy lapsed. Pioneer had no 
workers compensation insurance coverage with any insurance carrier as of this date.57 
Pioneer's coverage lapsed exactly two years from the date of Pioneer's original 
UBIC policy effective date of February 22, 2008. February 22 of each year was noted as 
the anniversary Pioneer's UBIC policies would either lapse or be renewed. UBIC had no 
workers compensation coverage from February 22, 2010 until it began a new policy with 
UBIC policy #WUB0001241 with the effective date of April 1, 2010.58 (Note: It was 
during the 2010 lapse of coverage when UBIC was notified by WCF of its probable 
liability exposure for the Antone accident)59 
36. After UBIC filed a reformed Pioneer contract on February 18, 2011, the 
Labor Commission records show UBIC had two Pioneer policies from the period of April 
1, 2008 through March 31, 2009.60 The policy beginning April 1, 2008 is UBIC's 
reformed policy in which the original policy period dates were altered.61 Pioneer's 
original 2008 UBIC policy effective February 22, 2008 has not been altered or canceled 
on the Labor Commission's records.62 
57R.335. 
58R. 336-337. 
59R. 272-273. 
60R. 340-343. 
"Id 
62See Utah Code Ann. 34A-2-205. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This case involves a catastrophic workers' compensation injury claim. The claim is 
reserved by WCF for many millions of dollars. The novel and first impression "Targeted Tender 
Doctrine" argument raised by UBIC, if adopted by the Court, will have a wider reach than the 
case at bar. A decision adverse to WCF could require prospective amendment to workers5 
compensation contract forms, reevaluation of premium structures for Utah employers, and 
ree valuation of premiums charged primary carriers for their claim reinsurance. Adopting UBIC's 
arguments regarding contract interpretation, will affect the structure of the Workers' 
Compensation Act, particularly those areas dealing with the commencement and duration of an 
insurance carriers' liability to cover injuries to injured Utah employees. 
More particularly, WCF asks the Supreme Court to sustain the trial court's determination 
to apply the twin "Other Insurance" clauses in the employer's overlapping WCF and UBIC 
workers compensation insurance policies. UBIC filed a counter-motion with its response to 
WCF's motion. Accompanying its responsive memorandum UBIC submitted exhibits it created 
after the commencement of the lawsuit. The UBIC exhibits were created in an effort to reform 
the effective dates of its contract with the employer. The claim was mistake of fact. 
The trial court agreed the parol evidence rule precludes extra-contractual evidence to 
contradict clear and unambiguous terms. All documentary evidence presented by UBIC in its 
attempt to show mutual mistake of intent was created or not disclosed until after WCF demanded 
contribution and/or after the complaint was filed and/or after URCP 26(a) initial disclosures 
and/or even after UBIC responded to WCF's directed discovery requests. Not until responding 
to WCF's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment did UBIC disclose and/or create and/or produce 
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most of its principal exhibits. The trial court ruled, if admitted, such evidence does not reach the 
.1 
"clear and convincing" standard required to reform a contract. 
The strongest of public policies applies to the provisions of the Utah Workers' 
Compensation Act (the "Act"). The Supreme Court opined: 
Workers' compensation not only is a "question...of...importance to 
the public, " but also furthers a "public interest [that] is so 
strong... that we should place the policy beyond the reach of 
contract" [Citation omitted]... The legislature itself has placed 
workers'compensation "beyondthe reach of 
contract. "... [W]orkers' compensation represents a clear and 
substantial public policy...63 
An integral part of that policy [which is] beyond the reach of contract, is a legislatively 
set bright line to protect injured workers and to advise employers and insurance carriers of their 
respective responsibilities. Every insurance carrier that writes a policy of workers' compensation 
insurance is obligated to provide coverage until formal cancellation of the policy. Failure to 
notify the [Labor Commission] results in the continued liability of the carrier until the date that 
notice of cancellation is received by the [Labor Commission]64. Deviation from that standard 
would be a grievous corruption of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act. It would set in motion 
the potential for insurance carriers disputing coverage to delay payments to injured employees 
63Touchardv. La-Z-Boy, 2006 Ut 71 at P16-17; 148 P.3d 945, 951 (Utah 2006). 
64Utah Code Ann. Section 34A-2-205(l)(b) & (c): 
(b) A policy... is in effect from inception until canceled by filing with the 
division... a notification of cancellation...within ten days after the cancellation of a 
policy. 
(c) Failure to notify the division...results in the continued liability of the carrier 
until the date that notice of cancellation is received by the division... 
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while the disputes wound their way through litigation. Such corruption of the obvious legislative 
intent cannot be tolerated. Application of the law leaves no room for post accident contractual 
manipulation as suggested by UBIC. Application of the law leaves no room for any inference of 
post accident collusion. There is no evidence the Utah Labor Commission received any notice 
from UBIC of its intent to change the coverage commencement date until after February of 
2011-nearly three years after the employee's accident. 
Finally, UBIC's reliance on the "targeted tender doctrine" is misplaced. It is a very small 
minority doctrine not adopted by Utah. This Court should follow the traditional, majority and 
most conceptually sound approach. The National Counsel of Compensation Insurance ("NCCI") 
and Utah Insurance Department approved forms used by both carriers include identical "other 
insurance" clauses. They are not meaningless. The employer contracted with both WCF and 
UBIC. Both contracts provide resolution for concurrent coverage. Each carrier is obligated to 
pay its proportionate share. Applying the "targeted tender doctrine" giving the insured the choice 
between two concurrent coverages puts the insured employer in the unfortunate position of 
breaching either one or the other of the insurance contracts. Applying the "targeted tender 
doctrine" makes clear and unambiguous contracted terms meaningless. In this instance the 
doctrine is contrary to traditional contract construction rules and Utah's Workers' Compensation 
Act. The doctrine sets in motion opportunities for mischief. WCF's motion for partial summary 
judgment regarding other insurance was correctly granted. UBIC's counter motion for summary 
judgment was correctly denied. 
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ARGUMENT 
L NO FURTHER EVIDENCE IS NECESSARY TO ESTABLISH 
THAT PIONEER'S UBIC POLICY WAS EFFECTIVE 
BEGINNING FEBRUARY 22,2008. 
UBIC argues it was entitled to additional discover}7 before the trial court entered 
its summary judgment. Further factual discovery was unnecessary for either the trial 
court or this Court to determine that February 22, 2008 was the effective date of Pioneer's 
2008 UBIC policy. The parol evidence rule precludes any extra-contractual evidence 
from being considered when the terms of an integrated contract are clear and 
unambiguous. As held by this Court: 
. . . [the parol evidence rule] operates in the absence of fraud to exclude 
contemporaneous conversations, statements, or representations offered for 
the purpose of varying or adding to the terms of an integrated contract.65 
Pioneer's 2008 UBIC policy clearly and unambiguously states more than thirty 
times that coverage commenced February 22, 2008. UBIC should not be allowed to 
present extra-contractual parol evidence to alter the clear effective date of that policy. To 
do so would violate well established rules of contract interpretation. 
A. UBIC and Pioneer Intended their 2008 Policy to 
Become Effective On February 22,2008. 
The actions of UBIC and Pioneer contemporaneous to the time they signed the 
2008 UBIC contract, and in the months and years that followed, demonstrate that 
February 22, 2008 was the intended effective date. WCF recognizes that a Court of 
65Union Bank v. Swenson, 707 P.2d 663, 665 (Utah 1985) 
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equity may reform a contract and look to parol evidence to reform a contract in the event 
of a mutual mistake of the parties.66 However, no mutual mistake exists in this case. The 
actions of UBIC and Pioneer contemporaneous with the signing of Pioneer's original 
2008 UBIC policy clearly demonstrates that they both intended February 22, 2008 to be 
the effective date of the policy. 
This Court has established the applicable rule: 
. . . A party may not sign a contract and thereafter assert ignorance or 
failure to read the contract as a defense. . . 
... . a person who, having the capacity and an opportunity to read a 
contract, is not misled as to its contents. . . and. . . cannot avoid the 
contract on the ground of mistake if he signs it. . . To permit a party, when 
sued on a written contract, to admit that he signed it but to deny that it 
expresses the agreement he made or to allow him to admit that he signed it 
but did not read it or know its stipulations would absolutely destroy the 
value of all contracts. The purpose of the rule is to give stability to written 
agreements and to remove the temptation and possibility of perjury, which 
would be afforded if parol evidence were admissible.™ 
By Affidavit attached to UBIC's response memorandum in this matter Pioneer 
owner, John Stout, stated "upon receipt of the policy from UBIC I reviewed i t . . ."68 As 
the party who drafted the policy, UBIC also, by necessity, reviewed the policy 
documentation before formalizing it. 
66 Rick Warner Trucklandv. Kurt F. Sirstins, 838 P.2d 666, 670 (Utah 1989). 
67 John Call Engineering v. Manti City Corporation, 743 P.2d 1205, 1208 (Utah 
1987), quoting Garff Realty Co. v. Better Buildings, Inc. 234 P.2d 842, 843 (Utah 1951). 
(Emphasis Added) 
68R. 125-127. 
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i 
As the drafting party, UBIC inserted the effective date for Pioneer's UBIC policy 
as February 22, 2008 over thirty times in the contract.69 It is not a contractual term that is 
inconspicuously hidden somewhere deep inside the pages of a wordy document. The 
policy effective date appears on the cover page of the policy itself and on nearly every 
single page of the policy thereafter. It is inconceivable that UBIC and Pioneer were not 
aware of the policy effective date in the contract when the policy was formalized. To 
allow UBIC and Pioneer, who both read and reviewed the contract, to avoid the policy 
effective date that was so clearly outlined and assented to by both contracting parties is 
the evil the court warned would "absolutely destroy the value of all contracts." 
Even if extra contractual parol evidence were allowed, the parol evidence 
contemporaneous with the contract formation and during the policy period also 
unmistakably proves that February 22, 2008 was the intended effective date. Every 
UBIC premium invoice sent to Pioneer from February 2008 to February 2009 states 
"Policy Period: 02/22/2008 to 02/22/2009."70 Pioneer made monthly premium payments 
to UBIC for that time period.71 UBIC affirmed by letter to Pioneer that February 22, 2008 
was the inception date of the policy: 
. . . Since your policy was incepted on February 22nd, you are only 
obligated to report your payroll form from February 22nd to February 29th. 
69R. 204-231. 
70R. 234-247. [Emphasis Added] 
llId. 
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This premium and reporting form is due March 20th.72 
Pioneer made a partial month premium payment to UBIC in response to this letter 
and the premium invoice in the amount of $257.63 for the period February 22, 2008 
through February 29, 2008. Pioneer also paid $1231.83 of premium to UBIC for the full 
month of March 2008, the month of Mr. Antone's accident.73 
Finally, Pioneer's 2008 UBIC policy expired on February 21, 2009.74 Pioneer 
renewed its UBIC policy and was assigned a new UBIC policy number on February 22, 
2009, exactly one year after the original effective date of the UBIC policy.75 Pioneer's 
2009 UBIC policy subsequently expired again on February 21, 2010, after which UBIC 
failed to maintain any active workers compensation insurance for a period of time.76 
Pioneer's UBIC policies either lapsed or were renewed on February 22 of every year. 
Pioneer and UBIC's intent regarding the February 22, 2008 effective date at the time of 
the policy formation and during the policy period is clear. There was no mutual mistake 
of fact. UBIC and Pioneer both assented to the February 22, 2008 effective date by 
signing the contract and by their actions during the policy period. 
72R. 250. (Emphasis Added) 
73R. 234-235. 
74R. 332-333. 
15
 Id 
76R. 334-337. 
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B. The Trial Court Correctly Disregarded Pioneer and 
UBIC's Post Complaint, Self Serving Claims of an 
Alleged Intent to Commence Their Policy on April 
1,2008, Rather than February 22,2008 and 
Correctly Refused to Allow Any Further Discovery 
Pursuant to Rule 56(f) on that Issue. 
UBIC's and Pioneer's post complaint, self serving statements regarding their 
alleged intent to commence the UBIC policy term on April 1, 2008, rather than February 
22, 2008, is not supported by the evidence. There is no objective evidence 
contemporaneous with the policy formation or during the policy period of the contract 
that supports UBIC's mutual mistake argument. The only evidence UBIC has produced 
in support its mutual mistake argument, or that it could possibly produce with further 
discovery, is self serving and subjective post-Complaint testimony from its officers and 
John Stout. UBIC should not be allowed to present anything other than evidence created 
contemporaneously to the contract formation itself to support mutual mistake of fact.77 
The trial court also correctly decided, as a matter of law, that "no reasonable jury 
could conclude that the parties agreed to [the effective date of April 1, 2008]."78 No 
reasonable jury would determine in this case that the policy effective date was anything 
other than February 22, 2008. That result is inevitable based on the evidence that was 
before the trial court or any suspect post-Complaint testimony evidence UBIC has already 
provided or could potentially provide through further discovery. 
11
 Union Bank v. Swenson, 707 P.2d 663, 665 (Utah 1985) 
nJohnson v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., 818 P.2d 997, 1001 (Utah 1991). 
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1. UBIC's Post-Complaint, Self Serving 
Statements Regarding Its Pioneer Contract 
Inception Date Under the Circumstances of 
this Case Is Not Clear and Convincing 
Evidence of Mutual Mistake of Fact. 
Any post-complaint statements from its officers or John Stout that UBIC has 
already produced regarding the parties' intent, or that it could potentially produce with 
further discovery, would need to be reviewed by the trial court and this Court with the 
highest degree of skepticism and scrutiny. UBIC claims mutual mistake of the parties 
regarding the policy effective date to avoid the parol evidence rule and in an attempt to 
avoid its obligations under the "other insurance" clause of Pioneer's 2008 UBIC policy. 
Mutual mistake of the contracting parties is an exception to the parol evidence rule. 
However, "where the document is unambiguous on its face, the challenging party must 
present proof of mistake by clear and convincing evidence."79 This Court has 
recognized the importance of imposing the highest burden of proof on parties claiming 
mutual mistake in an attempt to alter or reform the unambiguous terms of a written 
contract: 
. . . In such case the burden rests upon the moving party of overcoming the 
strong presumption arising from the terms of the written instrument. If the 
proofs are doubtful or unsatisfactory, if there be a failure to overcome 
this presumption by testimony entirely plain and convincing beyond 
reasonable controversy, the writing will be held to express correctly the 
intention of the parties... 
19Louis L. Timm v. T. Lamar Dewsnup, 921 P.2d 1381, 1392 (Utah 1996). 
[Emphasis Added] 
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. . . If it were once established that the effect of a written instrument could 
be avoided by a bare preponderance of parol evidence, the gates to perjury 
would soon be wide open. . 80 
This Court continued; 
The evidence necessary to establish a mutual mistake, and to warrant a 
court of equity in correcting a written instrument, must be such as to leave 
no reasonable doubt in the mind of the court, and when the mistake is 
denied. . . the proof must be strong to overcome such denial If the 
evidence is at all loose, confused, contradictory, or uncertain, it is 
insufficient to support a decree for the reformation of a written 
instrument?1 
The Court "must be persuaded by the clearest kind of evidence that a mistake has 
been made by both parties."82 
The trial court correctly ruled that UBIC was unable to meet this high burden. 
First and foremost, the intended February 22, 2008 effective date of Pioneer's and 
UBIC's workers compensation contract was clear and unambiguous from the 
documentary parol evidence created contemporaneously with the policy formation and 
during the policy period. The circumstances under which UBIC has developed, or will be 
able to develop its post complaint testimony parol evidence regarding mutual mistake is 
suspect at best and a calculated manipulation of evidence at worst. It is not and would not 
be "convincing beyond reasonable controversy." The post-complaint timing, lack of 
^Deseret National Bank v. Henry Dinwoody, 53 P.215, 216 (Utah 1898). Emphasis 
added. 
87d. at217. Emphasis added. 
nReidD. Bench v. Erma Pace, 538 P.2d 180, 182 (Utah 1975) Emphasis added. 
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contemporaneous evidence supporting the alleged mutual mistake, and UBIC's self 
interest in producing statements from its officers or encouraging such statements from 
Pioneer claiming mutual mistake of the contract inception date invariably leads to 
"reasonable doubt". There is reasonable doubt regarding whether the statements from 
UBIC's agents truly demonstrate UBIC's intent at the time of the contract formation or 
whether it is a belated ploy to avoid its contractual liability on a costly claim. 
A brief outline of the pre and post-complaint actions by UBIC in this case 
highlights the suspect nature of its attempts to belatedly change the history of its 2008 
Pioneer policy. WCF refers the Court to the chronological outline of events surrounding 
this litigation in its Statement of Facts above to support this point. 
In short, WCF informed UBIC of the overlapping coverage on March 10, 2010.83 
UBIC was served with WCF's complaint on September 13, 2010 in which WCF 
requested equitable pro rata contribution from UBIC for the amounts WCF has paid on 
Mr. Antone's claim. Less than one month later on October 8, 2010, and only five days 
before UBIC filed its Answer, John Stout, Pioneer's owner, sent a letter to UBIC stating 
he did not want UBIC involved in Mr. Antone's claim.84 He did not raise any concern 
about the UBIC policy effective date at this time. This was not spontaneous 
correspondence from Pioneer. It was the first time in over three years since Antone's 
R. 271-272. 
R. 346. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
accident that Pioneer raised any concerns about its policy coverage with UBIC or WCF. 
All reasonable inferences are that UBIC contacted John Stout about this litigation and 
urged him to write the letter. 
Two weeks after initial disclosures were exchanged, John Stout sent another letter 
to UBIC dated December 16, 2010 in which he refined his concerns to more fully fit 
UBIC's claim of mutual mistake by claiming, for the first time, that it intended its 2008 
UBIC policy to commence on April 1, 2008, rather than February 22, 2008.85 Again, all 
reasonable inferences are that this letter was not spontaneous and was sent after further 
contact by one or more UBIC representatives. 
Further, only two weeks after WCF sent discovery notices requesting copies of all 
of UBIC s Pioneer policy documentation and related correspondence, UBIC unilaterally 
commenced the process of reforming its 2008 Pioneer policy on January 19, 2011 without 
WCF's or the trial court's knowledge.86 On February 18, 2011, more than five months 
after UBIC was served with WCF's complaint, UBIC issued a reformed contract altering 
the effective date of Pioneer's 2008 policy from February 22, 2008 to April 1, 2008 and 
filed the reformed contract with the Utah Labor Commission.87 UBIC filed the revised 
contract despite UBIC president Ron Nielsen's verification on February 16, 2011 that 
R. 347. 
R. 301-303. 
U. 129-150. 
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February 22, 2008 was the policy inception date. 
UBIC assured WCF following supplemental discovery responses dated February 
22, 2011 that it had provided all of Pioneer's 2008 policy documents. However, it failed 
to disclose its attempts to reform its 2008 Pioneer policy or the reformed contract filed 
with the Labor Commission only four days earlier. The reformed contract was not 
disclosed to WCF until after WCF filed its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment in a 
further discovery supplementation dated March 25, 2011.89 The trial court correctly 
refused to allow such manipulation of evidence by granting WCF's motion and 
disregarding the reformed contract. 
UBIC also claimed before the trial court that it credited Pioneer with the premiums 
it received for February 2008 and March 2008 to buttress its mistake of fact argument.90 
However, this alleged credit occurred in February 2011, more than five months after this 
litigation began and more than one year after it was put on notice of Pioneer's 
overlapping coverage. UBIC had no problem accepting Pioneer's premium money for the 
overlap period and keeping it in its coffers until after this litigation commenced. Only 
when it became apparent that holding on to those premiums would make it contractually 
obligated to pay its share of Mr. Antone's claim did it credit the premium back. 
88R. 305-313. 
*
9Id. 
90R. 107, 122-123. 
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UBIC's post-Complaint actions to avoid liability were not mere coincidence or a 
product of the discovery process. It was a calculated effort to change history. It was a 
calculated effort by UBIC to manipulate the clear uncontroverted facts to avoid its 
contractual liability. There is reasonable doubt regarding the legitimacy of any of 
Pioneer's or UBIC's post-Complaint statements. That includes the affidavits of Pioneer 
owner John Stout and UBIC president Ron Nielsen that were submitted with UBIC's 
response memorandum in opposition to WCF's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.91 
Any post complaint parol evidence statements or testimony produced by UBIC to 
support its mutual mistake claim will not be "convincing beyond reasonable controversy.' 
UBIC has not, and will not, be able to meet its burden of proving "by the clearest kind of 
evidence" that there was a mutual mistake of fact to overcome the parol evidence rule in 
this case. The contract and contemporaneous documentary evidence are unmistakably 
clear. Pioneer and UBIC intended the policy to be effective on February 22, 2008. No 
reasonable jury could find otherwise. 
2. UBIC has Already Provided All Documentary 
Evidence Regarding Its 2008 Pioneer Policy and 
None of It Supports UBIC's Alleged Mistake of 
Fact Regarding the February 22,2008 Pioneer 
Policy Inception Date. 
WCF has received every document in UBIC's possession related to 
Pioneer's 2008 UBIC policy. On January 6, 2011 WCF sent discovery requests to 
R. 122-127. 
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UBIC in which it specifically requested, in pertinent part92: 
REQUEST NO. 2: Please provide a complete and accurate copy of 
UBIC's workers compensation policies or policies 
covering Pioneer Roofing Company. 
REQUEST NO. 7: A copy of all letters, e-mail and any other 
correspondence whether hard copy or electronic 
between UBIC and Pioneer Roofing Company 
regarding Pioneer Roofing Company's workers 
compensation coverage with either UBIC or WCF. 
REQUEST NO. 10: A copy of all documents, letters, e-mail and other 
correspondence, whether hard copy or electronic 
between any UBIC representative and any broker or 
insurance company regarding procurement or 
underwriting of UBIC's Pioneer roofing Company 
workers compensation policy. 
REQUEST NO. 11: A copy of all UBIC underwriting documents related to 
UBIC's Pioneer Roofing Company's workers 
compensation policy. 
UBIC responded to WCF's discovery requests on February 16, 2011 and by 
supplement on February 22, 201L93 In its discovery responses UBIC's president, Ron 
Nielsen, confirmed that February 22, 2008 was the effective policy date.94 UBIC 
confirmed that "all 2008 policy documents have been produced."95 WCF also has 
produced all documentary evidence of its 2008 policy with Pioneer. Thus, the further 
92R. 294-298. 
93R. 306-314. 
94Id 
95R. 323. 
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documentary discovery requested by UBIC would not have revealed any more documents. 
None of the 2008 Pioneer policy documents or related correspondence produced 
by UBIC created contemporaneously with the policy formation or life of the policy 
support a date other than February 22, 2008 as the policy effective date. None of it 
discusses Pioneer's WCF policy or the March 31, 2008 lapse date. UBIC simply has no 
objective documentary evidence that shows the policy inception date should have been 
anything other than February 22, 2008. There was no mutual mistake of fact regarding 
the February 22, 2008 inception date and the trial correctly refused to allow further 
discovery pursuant to Rule 56(f) on that issue. 
IL PUBLIC POLICY PRECLUDES POST ACCIDENT INCEPTION 
DATE REFORMATION OF WORKERS COMPENSATION 
INSURANCE POLICIES. 
An employer and insurance carrier should not be allowed to reform the effective 
date of a workers compensation contract years after its inception and after a worker is 
injured during the policy period. It invites collusive mischief to avoid costly claims. It 
corrupts the clear statutorily mandated public policy of inclusive workers' compensation 
insurance coverage and speedy payment of medical expenses and weekly compensation 
benefits to injured workers. UBICs attempt to recreate the history of its policy of 
insurance exemplifies the potential for such mischief. A bright line rule against 
reformation of clear and unambiguous workers compensation insurance contracts post 
liability incurring event is spelled out in the Utah Workers Compensation Act. 
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The Utah Supreme Court strongly reminded employers and their insurance carriers 
of the dominating public policy behind the Workers Compensation Act in the recent 
Touchard v. La-Z-Boy case: 
Workers' Compensation not only is a "question ...of...importance to the 
public, " but also furthers a "public interest [that] is so strong... that we 
should place the policy beyond the reach of contract.,m 
This dominating public policy applies to reformation of clear and unambiguous 
workers compensation contracts, especially after an accident occurs. The overarching 
public policy of the Workers Compensation Act in favor of coverage for injured workers 
dictates that such reformations not be allowed. 
The overarching public policy favoring coverage and timely payment of benefits 
to injured workers is clear by the coverage requirements outlined in the Workers 
Compensation Act. Once an employer receives notice of a workplace injury it is required 
to "file a report with the [Labor Commission].. ."97 When that report of injury has been 
filed then payment of benefits by the employer, or its insurance carrier[s], is statutorily 
mandated. 
Utah Code Annotated §34A-2-401 provides: 
(1) An employee . . . who is injured. . . by accident arising out of and in the 
course of the employee's employment\ wherever such injury occurred. . . 
shall be paid: 
96Touchardv. La-Z-Boy, 148 P.3d 545 (Utah 2006), 2006 Utah Lexis 207 at P 16. 
Emphasis added. 
97Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-407(5)(a). 
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(a) compensation for loss sustained on account of the injury or death; 
(b) the amount provided in this chapter for: 
(i) medical, nurse, and hospital services; 
(ii) medicines, . . 
(2) The responsibility for compensation and payment of medical, nursing, 
and hospital services and medicines, and funeral expenses provided under 
this chapter shall be: 
(a) on the employer and the employer's insurance carrier; (Emphasis 
Added) 
An employer's report of an injury to the Labor Commission is statutorily required. 
Likewise, payment of benefits to an injured worker by an employer's insurance carrier[s] 
is statutorily required. That mandatory coverage and payment of benefits is in line with 
the strong public policy outlined in Touchard v. La-Z-Boy. Reformation of a workers 
compensation contract after an employee is injured during the policy period directly 
impacts the statutorily mandated rights of injured workers to receive workers 
compensation benefits in the event of a workplace injury. 
Allowing UBIC and Pioneer to alter the effective date of its policy years after Mr. 
Antone's accident would create a dangerous precedent and severely undermine the strong 
public policy of the Workers Compensation Act. It would invite insurance carriers to 
engage in self-serving mischief to avoid their statutory obligations to provide workers 
compensation benefits on potentially costly claims. The overarching public policy of the 
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Workers Compensation Act's guaranteed coverage for injured workers precludes UBIC's 
claim of mutual mistake of fact and its post-accident attempts at policy period 
reformation. 
III. UBIC'S ORIGINAL 2008 PIONEER POLICY IS STILL 
ACTIVE PURSUANT TO SECTION UTAH CODE ANN. 
§34A-2-205 RESULTING IN UBIC'S CONTINUED 
LIABILITY FOR A PRO-RATA SHARE OF MR. ANTONE'S 
CLAIM. 
UBIC's original 2008 Pioneer policy is still active pursuant to the Workers 
Compensation Act and covers Mr. Antone's March 21, 2008 industrial injury. Utah Code 
Annotated §34A-2-205 states; 
(b) A [workers compensation] policy. . . is in effect from inception until 
canceled by filing with the division . . . a notification of cancellation in the 
form prescribed by the division within ten days after the cancellation of a 
policy. 
(c) Failure to notify the division . . . results in the continued liability of the 
98 
carrier.. . 
This strict requirement is also affirmed in Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-1002: 
(1) Any insurer assuming a workers' compensation risk shall carry it until 
the policy is canceled, either: 
(a) by agreement between the Division of Industrial Accidents in the 
Labor Commission, the insurer, and the employer; or 
(b) after: 
(i) notice by the insurer to the employer as provided in 
Section 31A-21-303; and 
(ii) notice to the Division of Industrial Accidents in the 
Labor Commission as provided in Section 34A-2-205. 
(Emphasis Added) 
'Utah Code Annotated §34A-2-205 (Emphasis Added) 
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UBIC has not issued a notification of cancellation of its 2008 Pioneer policy with 
an effective date February 22, 2008. In fact, the current Labor Commission records verify 
that UBIC's 2008 policy still covers the date of Mr. Antone's March 21, 2008 accident." 
UBIC attempted to skirt around this rule and avoid coverage for the March 21, 2008 
accident by filing another 2008 Pioneer policy with the Labor Commission in February or 
March 2011 with a reformed policy effective date of April 1, 2008.10° However, the 
Labor Commission records now merely show that there were two Pioneer UBIC policies 
in 2008, one commencing February 22, 2008 and the other on April 1, 2008.101 
The original policy covering Mr. Antone's accident date is still active. UBIC has 
not cancelled it. By statute, it "is in effect from inception until canceled." Cancellation 
should not be allowed if UBIC were to attempt to do so now. Pursuant to the Workers 
Compensation Act, UBIC's failure to cancel its original 2008 Pioneer policy with the 
intended February 22, 2008 policy effective date "results in the continued liability" for its 
pro rata share of the benefits and costs of Mr. Antone's claim. 
UBIC argues in its brief that the policy cancellation requirements of the Workers 
Compensation Act do not preclude raising defenses to its coverage. It states additional 
fact discovery is necessary to prove it was not responsible for covering Mr. Antone's 
"R.331. 
100R. 340-341. 
mI(L 
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injuries. As argued previously, UBIC has not, and will not, be able to prove by "clear and 
convincing" evidence that it's 2008 UBIC policy did not cover Mr. Antone's accident. 
UBIC admitted it has already provided all the documentary evidence related to its 2008 
Pioneer policy. None of the documentary evidence created contemporaneous with 
Pioneer's 2008 UBIC policy formation supports UBIC's reformation and mutual mistake 
arguments. 
Any additional fact finding requested by UBIC to cull out post-complaint, self 
serving testimony from other UBIC or Pioneer personnel will be suspect under the 
circumstances of this case. UBIC already provided post-complaint affidavits from the 
UBIC president and Pioneer with statements regarding their intent of the policy effective 
date.102 Those post complaint declarations of their alleged intent are contrary to the well 
established intent within the four corners of the contract itself. The timing and self 
serving nature of those affidavits on the part of UBIC raise reasonable doubt regarding 
whether they represent their true intent at the time of contract formation or the are just a 
belated ploy to avoid liability. Further discovery is unnecessary. The trial court correctly 
ruled that UBIC's defenses to coverage fail. 
Under the requirements of Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-205 and §31A-22-1002, UBIC 
failed to cancel its 2008 Pioneer workers compensation policy with the inception date of 
Februaray 22, 2008. That results in UBIC's continued liability under the "other 
102R. 122-123, 125-127. 
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insurance" clause of its 2008 Pioneer contract to pay a pro-rata share of the benefits on 
Mr. Antone's claim. 
IV. THE "TARGETED TENDER DOCTRINE" SHOULD NOT BE 
APPLIED TO THIS CASE NOR ADOPTED IN UTAH. IT IS 
CONTRARY TO PIONEER'S WCF AND UBIC CONTRACTS 
AND CONTRARY TO THE OVERARCHING PUBLIC 
POLICY OF THE WORKERS COMPENSATION ACT. 
UBIC relies on several cases from foreign jurisdictions which apply the "targeted" 
or "selective" tender doctrine. Such reliance is misplaced. The "targeted tender" doctrine 
has not been adopted in Utah. The doctrine has been adopted by only a very small 
number of jurisdictions. It is a legal theory originating in Illinois courts. Based on 
WCFs research, there are no courts that have applied the doctrine in the workers 
compensation context of mandatory insurance and mandatory payment of benefits. 
UBIC's brief is replete with string cites to foreign jurisdictions analyzing issues 
other than "targeted tender." The vast majority of cases in UBIC's string cites do not 
directly analyze the targeted tender doctrine in any context, let alone in the workers 
compensation arena. Infusion of long string cites in UBICs brief gives an inaccurate 
allusion of general acceptance. Again, with emphasis, the "targeted tender" doctrine is a 
creation of the Illinois courts. Few others have embarked on that path.103 
This case is distinguishable from the cases in the few jurisdictions that have 
applied some form of the "targeted tender" doctrine in a liability insurance context. None 
1034 Bruner & O'Connor, Construction Law (2011) § 11:59 
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of those cases analyzed the doctrine in the workers compensation context. That 
distinction is of critical importance. "Targeted tender" is contrary to the concept of 
protecting injured workers through mandatory insurance required by the workers 
compensation system in Utah. Its application would force Pioneer to breach one of its 
workers compensation contracts with WCF or UBIC. The doctrine is contrary to the 
strong public policy of the Workers Compensation Act. 
The traditional, more fair and well reasoned majority approach regarding 
overlapping coverages with "other insurance" clauses is.. .when two policies contain pro 
rata "other insurance" clauses, each insurer is liable for that proportion of loss which 
the face amount of its policy bears to the "total amount of collectible and valid 
insurance. "104 Utah should follow the majority approach. It should allow WCF to 
exercise its contractual right to receive equitable pro rata contribution from UBIC on Mr. 
Antone's claim by applying the twin "other insurance" clauses in both UBIC's and 
WCF's Pioneer contracts. The "targeted tender" doctrine should not be adopted in Utah. 
104Aspen Publishers, Handbook On Insurance Coverage Disputes, 15th Edition, 
§11.03[c][I], page 977 citing to JP. Realty Trust v. Public Service Mutual Insurance 0., 
102 A.D.2d 68, 71-73,476 N.YS.2d 325, 327-328 (1st Dep't 1984), afl'd, 64 N.Y.2d 945, 
477 N.E.2d 1104, 488 N. YS.2d 650 (1985) in which the court ruled that because both 
policies contained the identical "contribution by equal shares" language, both insurers 
were obligated and the contributions should "be by equal shares". 
Page 39 of 54 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
A. The "Targeted Tender" Doctrine is Inconsistent with 
Pioneer's WCF and UBIC Contracts that Require 
Immediate Tender of a Workers Compensation Claim 
Involving Injuries to the Employer's Insurance 
Companies. 
Application of the "targeted tender" doctrine would force Pioneer to breach one of 
its overlapping workers compensation insurance contracts. The relevant terms of those 
contracts are clear and unambiguous. When a contract is unambiguous "a court may 
interpret it as a matter of law"105, however, "in doing so, a court must attempt to construe 
the contract so as to harmonize and give effect to all of [its] provisions."106 This Court 
should interpret Pioneer's WCF and UBIC contracts so as to give effect to all of the 
provisions of both contracts. Application of the "targeted tender" doctrine would render 
some of the contract terms ineffective and meaningless. 
First, UBIC's claim that the WCF and UBIC policies don't require a tender of the 
claim to both insurance companies is inconsistent with the contracts. "Part Four" of both 
Pioneer's UBIC and WCF contracts specifically required Pioneer to "tell [WCF and 
UBIC] at once if injury occurs that may be covered by this policy."107 Thus, Pioneer was 
contractually required under both its WCF and UBIC contracts to immediately tender the 
claim to both carriers if an injury occurs that may be covered by the policies. Pioneer did 
105Dixon v. Pro-Image, Inc., 987 P.2d 48, 52 (Utah 1999). Citing WillardPease Oil & 
Gas Co. v. Pioneer Oil & Gas Co., 899 P.2d 766, 770 (Utah 1995). 
106Id. Citing Nielsen v. O'Reilly, 848 P.2d 664, 665 (Utah 1993). 
107R. 110. 
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not have the option to forego tendering the claim to UBIC. Failing to do so was a breach 
of its UBIC contract. 
WCF's and UBIC's policies preclude application of the "targeted tender" doctrine 
in this case. Pioneer's failure to timely tender Mr. Antone's injury claim to UBIC, in 
violation of its contract, should not absolve UBIC of its contractual responsibility for its 
pro-rata share of costs on Mr. Antone's claim. There is simply no room for the "targeted 
tender" doctrine under the clear and unambiguous notice terms of Pioneer's WCF and 
UBIC contracts requiring a tender of the claim. 
Second, adoption of the "targeted tender" doctrine would contravene the clear 
contractual terms in the twin "Other Insurance" clauses of the contracts and render them 
meaningless. It would strip WCF of its contractual right of equitable pro rata contribution 
from a co-insurer allowed by the "other insurance" clause. WCF specifically contracted 
for that right with Pioneer. 
Pioneer also agreed in its WCF contract to "do nothing after an injury occurs that 
would interfere with [WCF's] right to recover from others."108 Pioneer's letters to UBIC 
stating it does not want UBIC involved with Mr. Antone's claim in an attempt to buttress 
UBIC's "targeted tender" argument runs counter to that contractual duty. In that sense, 
adopting the "targeted tender" doctrine would also force Pioneer to breach its contract 
with WCF because the letters interfere with WCF's contractual right to recover an 
108R. 95. 
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equitable contribution for Mr. Antone's claim under the "other insurance" clause from 
UBIC. 
The "Targeted Tender" doctrine is legally unsound and is contrary to long 
established contract construction rules. It impedes the rights of parties to contract with 
one another and is contrary to the workers compensation contracts involved in this case. 
Its adoption would render clear and unambiguous terms in Pioneer's overlapping workers 
compensation contracts ineffective and meaningless. On the other hand, by not applying 
the "targeted tender" doctrine to this case, the Court would "harmonize and give effect" 
to all of the terms of both of Pioneer's WCF and UBIC contracts and would prevent 
Pioneer from breaching either of the overlapping contracts. 
This Court should apply the clear terms of the contracts that Pioneer agreed to with 
both UBIC and WCF. The fact that Pioneer did not timely tender the claim to UBIC in 
violation of.its UBIC contract does not alter application of the "other insurance" clauses 
of the contracts. The "other insurance" clauses operate in a workers compensation 
context regardless of the direction the insured chose to tender the claim. Therefore, 
Pioneer's tender of the clam to WCF rather than UBIC is irrelevant, violated Pioneer's 
UBIC contract, and does not prevent WCF from pursuing its right of equitable 
contribution from UBIC. 
Page 42 of 54 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
B. UBIC Received Notice of Mr. Antone's Accident at the 
Time of the Accident by Function of Pioneer's UBIC 
Contract Following that Notice, the Workers 
Compensation Act Requires UBIC's Participation in the 
Payment Benefits for Mr. Antone's Claim. 
UBIC argues it did not receive notice of Mr. Antone's accident until WCF's March 
2010 correspondence requesting pro-rata contribution for the claim. However, when 
UBIC received notice of the claim is irrelevant. It is still statutorily and contractually 
required to participate in the payment of the workers compensation benefits on Mr. 
Antone's claim. 
Pioneer's UBIC contract specifically states, "as between an injured worker and us, 
we have notice of the injury when you [Pioneer] have notice."109 In addition, Utah Code 
Ann. §31A-22-1006 provides: 
Every workersy compensation policy or contract shall contain a provision 
that, as between the employee and the insurer, notice to or knowledge of 
the occurrence of the injury on the party of the employer is considered to 
be notice or knowledge to the insurer. (Emphasis Added) 
Thus, by operation of contract and statute, UBIC had constructive notice of Mr. 
Antone's accident when Pioneer knew of it at the time of the accident. Whether UBIC 
had actual notice at the time of the accident is irrelevant to its obligations to perform 
under its workers compensation contract and under the Workers Compensation Act. 
Pursuant to the Workers Compensation Act, UBIC's legal notice and coverage of the 
accident requires UBIC's timely payment of the benefits required by the Act. 
109R. 227 (Section H sub-part 1.) 
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UBIC's Pioneer policy states "this insurance conforms to the parts of the workers 
compensation law that apply to benefits payable by this insurance."110 UBIC is 
contractually liable for the "[workers compensation] benefits payable" to Mr. Antone 
required by the Workers Compensation Act. As argued previously, Pioneer was 
statutorily required to file a report of the injury with the Labor Commission. Once that 
notice was provided, UBIC, as one of UBIC's workers compensation insurers, was then 
statutorily required to pay the workers compensation benefits mandated by the Act.111 
The overarching public policy in favor of coverage and guaranteed timely payment of 
benefits for injured workers mandates no less. 
The Act does not contemplate a "targeted tender" of a workers compensation claim 
when there is more than one liable insurance carrier. It does not allow an employer to 
unilaterally choose not to tender a workers compensation claim to his insurance carrier as 
the insured is free to do under a liability insurance context. Application of the "targeted 
tender" doctrine would only create disincentive on the part of overlapping insurance 
carriers to make timely payments of benefits to an injured worker while they fight over 
coverage and tender of claim issues. 
The "other insurance" clauses were included in the contracts to address the exact 
situation presented by this case of double coverage and to assure prompt payment of 
,10R. 227 (Section H sub-part 5. a.) 
lllSee Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-401. 
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benefits without confusion of which carrier should pay benefits. The trial court correctly 
applied those clauses. There is no room for application of the "targeted tender" doctrine 
in this case. The legislature did not contemplate adoption of such a doctrine when it 
passed the Workers Compensation Act nor can it be implied. 
The rationale of the few foreign jurisdiction cases cited by UBIC that have applied 
the "targeted tender" doctrine in a liability insurance context are distinguishable. In those 
cases immediate notice and tender of a claim to all insurance companies upon the 
occurrence of a covered claim by the insured was not contractually or statutorily required 
as it is in this case. UBIC's cited cases are of little or no value in a workers compensation 
context. They provide no relevant guidance where notice to the insurance carrier and 
payment of benefits is statutorily required for the benefit of an injured employee. 
An employer does not have the option in a workers compensation context in Utah 
to forego reporting of an injury to its workers compensation insurance carrier[s] or to 
direct whether one or more carriers, or no carrier, makes payments on the claim. Infusing 
such a doctrine into Utah's workers compensation system would corrupt the strong public 
policy of the Workers Compensation Act. It would put Utah's injured workers at risk of 
not having their statutorily required benefits paid until potentially years after their 
accident while overlapping insurance carriers squabble regarding coverage issues. That 
runs contrary to the overarching public policy of the Workers Compensation Act to 
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provide prompt and guaranteed payment of benefits to injured workers.112 The "targeted 
tender" doctrine is not legally or practically sound when applied to Utah's workers 
compensation system and should not be applied in this case. 
C. WCF's Right to Equitable Contribution from UBIC on 
Mr. Antone's Claim is a Right Independent of Any Right 
of the Insured Pioneer. 
UBIC claims WCF has no right of equitable contribution since Pioneer did not 
affirmatively tender Mr. Antone's claim to or notify UBIC of his accident. This argument 
fails unless this Court adopts the "targeted tender" doctrine. As argued above, there is no 
room for UBIC's "targeted tender" argument under the requirements of the Workers 
Compensation Act or Pioneer's WCF and UBIC contracts making this argument moot. 
Pioneer was contractually and statutorily required to tender Mr. Antone's claim to both 
WCF and UBIC, thus bringing the "other insurance" clauses of those contracts into play. 
However, discussion of equitable contribution claims in general is important because it is 
a right that is independent of any right conceivably held by Pioneer in relation to Mr. 
Antone's workers compensation claim. 
There are very few Utah cases that analyze equitable contribution claims in much 
detail. More relevant to this case, no Utah Court has ever analyzed equitable contribution 
claims in a workers compensation context. However, equitable contribution has been 
analyzed at length by other states. A right to equitable contribution in an insurance 
ll2See Touchard v. La-Z-Boy, 148 P.3d 545 (Utah 2006), 2006 Utah Lexis 207 at P 
16. 
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context "arises when several insurers are obligated to indemnify or defend the same loss 
or claim, and more than one insurer has paid more than its share of the loss or defended 
the action without any participation by the others."113 
Further, "the right to [equitable contribution] is not the insured's to disclaim. It is 
a right of other insurers, who are not parties to the insurance policy, and it is a right 
founded not on the concept of third party beneficiaries of contracts, and hence not on the 
wishes of the insured but rather on notions of equity and unjust enrichment."114 Finally; 
. . . the right to equitable contribution exists independently of the rights of 
the insured. It is predicated on the commonsense principle that where 
multiple insurers or indemnitors share equal contractual liability for the 
primary indemnification of a loss or the discharge of an obligation, the 
selection of which indemnitor is to bear the loss should not be left to the 
often arbitrary choice of the loss claimant, and no indemnitor should 
have any incentive to avoid paying a claim in the hope the claimant will 
obtain full payment from another coindemnitor.. .115 
That reasoning is sound and reasonable. In a very recent California decision dated 
December 14, 2011, the court analyzed the "targeted" or "selective tender" doctrine 
directly in relation to this equitable contribution precedent. The defendant insurance 
company in that case attempted to have the California courts adopt the "targeted tender" 
or "selective tender" doctrine in California. The California court rebuffed those attempts. 
xn
 HartfordCasualty Ins. Co. v. Mt. Hawley Ins. Co. 123 Cal. App. 4th 278, 287-288 
(2004). 
114
 Underwriters at Lloyd's v. Massachusetts Bonding and Insurance Co., 230 P.3d 103, 
113 (Ore. 2010), citing Rhone-Pulenc Inc. v. International Ins. Co., 71 F.3d 1299, 1305 (7th Cir. 
1995). 
1X5Id. [Emphasis Added]. 
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The footnote in which this analysis occurred is quoted in its entirety; 
We are unpersuaded that a Washington case on which ASIC relies {Mutual 
of Enumclaw Ins. Co. v. USFIns. Co., 191 P.3d 866 [Wash 2008]) should 
apply here. In that case, the court's analysis was heavily dependant on the 
so called "selective tender" rule, which appears to bar a participating insurer 
from seeking contribution from a nonparticipating insurer based solely on 
whether the insured elected to tender to the nonparticipating insurer. "The 
selective tender rule has had little traction outside of Illinois" (4 Bruner & 
O'Connor, Construction Law (2011) § 11:59), and the rule appears 
inconsistent with California law that "the right to equitable contribution 
exists independently of the rights of the insured . . . [and] where multiple 
insurers . . . share equal contractual liability for the primary indemnification 
of a loss or the discharge of an obligation, the selection of which indemnitor 
is to bear the loss should not be left to the often arbitrary choice of the loss 
claimant." {Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 11 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 296 (1998), 65 Cal. App. 4th 1279.) Because Mutual of Enumclaw 
turned principally on rules that appear incompatible with California law, we 
ascribe no significance to its analysis.116 
UBIC's argument that the right to tender a claim is a paramount right of the 
insured is of little value in the context of an equitable contribution claim which is 
exclusively the right of a plaintiff insurance company and is "independent of the rights of 
the insured." The decision on which workers compensation insurance carrier should 
shoulder the burden of Mr. Antone's claim was not Pioneer's to make. Pioneer has no 
right either by contract or statute to interfere with WCF's equitable contribution claim 
against UBIC. Further, this recent California decision demonstrates that UBIC 
incorrectly argues that no state in which the "targeted tender" doctrine has introduced has 
U6American States Insurance Company v. National Fire Insurance Company of Hartford, 
Case No. D057673, Court of Appeals of California, Fourth District, Division One. Filed 
December 14, 2011. [Emphasis is the Court's] 
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failed to adopt the doctrine. The fact still remains that very few jurisdictions have 
adopted the doctrine and that "it has had little traction outside of Illinois." 
The Utah Supreme Court is in harmony with the equitable contribution analysis in 
California. This Court held; 
We agree with those jurisdictions that have allowed contribution where one 
insurer has paid more than its fair share of the defense costs. Where it can 
be shown that a co-insurer failed to defend or failed to pay its fair share of 
defense expenses, that insurer should not be rewarded and payment excused 
when another co-insurer has taken upon itself the provision of that defense. 
Holding otherwise would not only lead to an inequitable result but may also 
conflict with our stated policy of encouraging prompt payments to the 
insured, leaving disputes concerning coverage to be determined later.117 
UBIC's requested application of the "targeted tender" doctrine would create the 
very evil envisioned by this Court in violation of public policy. It would infuse confusion 
into Utah's workers compensation system when more than one insurance policy covers a 
potential claim and discourage prompt payments to an injured worker while insurance 
companies with that shared liability litigate coverage and tender of claim issues. Like 
California, the "targeted tender" doctrine is incompatible with Utah law governing 
equitable contribution. It is also incompatible with the overarching public policy of 
Utah's Workers Compensation Act which was passed to assure prompt payment of 
benefits to injured workers and requires tendering of all workers compensation claims to 
an employer's insurance company or insurance companies. The "targeted tender" 
1X1
 Sharon Steel Corporation v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, 931 P.2d 127, 137-
138 (Utah 1997). 
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doctrine should not be adopted in Utah, especially in the workers compensation context, 
nor should it be applied to this case. 
V. WCF WAS A CO-INSURANCE CARRIER WITH UBIC 
COVERING PIONEER'S LIABILITY TO INJURED 
EMPLOYEE ANTONK 
UBIC argues that WCF was not an intended third party beneficiary of Pioneer's 
2008 UBIC contract and, therefore, cannot seek to enforce the terms of that contract. 
UBIC's argument is off target. UBIC and WCF are co-insurers of the Antone workers 
compensation claim. WCF asks only that the clear terms of both contracts be enforced. 
If they are not enforced, then Pioneer is in breach of the policy: 
We will not pay more than our share of benefits and costs covered by this 
insurance and other insurance or self insurance. Subject to any limits of 
liability that may apply, all shares will be equal until the loss is paid. If any 
insurance or self insurance is exhausted, the shares of all remaining 
insurance will be equal until the loss is paid.118 
UBIC's third party beneficiary argument is superfluous to a resolution of this case. 
The "other insurance" clause is a Utah Insurance Department approved limitation of both 
WCF's and UBIC's respective liabilities. 
The court should also consider the legislative mandates: (1) WCF as carrier of last 
resort must accept applications of insurance from all Utah employers;119 and (2) As part 
of that mandate, WCF must "provide workers' compensation insurance at the lowest 
5R. 81 -82 and R. 92. [Emphasis Added] 
*Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-1001. 
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possible cost to policyholders consistent with maintaining the actuarial soundness . . ,"120 
Absent enforcement of the "other insurance" clause, WCF is deprived of a valuable 
contract! lal tool tx; ! Ifi i l l i l l i! iiat nt iissi< )t i. 
CONCLUSION 
UBIC and Pioneer intended their UBIC policy to begin on February 22, 2008. The 
c()i lti act clearly and una inhume :»i isly ii iclii ides tl mat inception date more than 30 times. 
UBIC billed Pioneer specifically for the partial monu. i ». - .. 
2008 and Pioneer paid the premium for those months. Mr. Antone's accident occurred 
during that policy period on March 21, 2008. The "other insurance" clause of Pioneer's 
2008 1 IBIC policj ' .it e qn iii c s I I B K I to pay its pro-rata share of Mi Antone's claim with 
WCF. The "other insurance" clause is a valuable conti ac 1 i i.al tool a^  ' ailable t< ) V ''''CI • t ; ) 
fulfill its mandate as Utah's workers compensation insurer of last resort to provide 
insurance at the lowest possible rate. As a co-insurer with UBIC, WCF should be 
allowed to seek enforcement of I1 
UBIC should not be allowed to introduce extra-coi iti acti ia.1 pai ol evidence to alter 
the clear effective date of its 2008 Pioneer policy. UBIC has already provided all the 
documentary evidence regarding its 2008 Pioneer policy. None of the documentary 
evidence conlrmpoumrnii1, in lite policy forma' • 'he policy period supports 
the alleged mistake of fact regarding the policy inception date. Ai ly post Comph iii it 
1 2 0I Jtah Code Ann. §31A 33 111. (Emphasis Added) 
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statements from John Stout or UBIC representatives already produced, or that could be 
produced with further discovery, to support the alleged mistake will not meet the required 
clear and convincing evidence threshold. Such post-Complaint statements are suspect 
under the circumstances of this case and should not be allowed. The trial court correctly 
refused to allow UBIC to introduce parol evidence. No further discovery is necessary to 
demonstrate February 22, 2008 was the effective date of the policy. 
The "targeted tender" doctrine is incompatible with the Utah Workers 
Compensation Act and the workers compensation contracts at issue in this case. Both of 
Pioneer's WCF and UBIC contracts require immediate notice/tender of an injured workers claim 
to both carriers. By contract and statute UBIC had constructive notice of Mr. Antone's injury at 
the time the accident occurred. Thus, the contracts didn't allow Pioneer to tender Mr. Antone's 
claim to one insurance carrier and exclude the other. Once that injury occurred UBIC was on 
notice of it and was statutorily required to pay the benefits to Mr. Antone required by the 
Workers Compensation Act. In this case, since Pioneer had dual coverage, the "other insurance" 
clauses of the WCF and UBIC contracts requiring pro-rata contribution from both insurance 
carriers apply. 
There is no room for application of the "targeted tender" doctrine in Utah's workers 
compensation system. It is contrary to the Act's overarching public policy of mandatory 
insurance coverage and payment of benefits to injured workers. Adoption of the doctrine would 
infuse confusion into the workers compensation system and put injured workers at risk that their 
benefits will not be paid for years while two overlapping insurers litigate coverage and tender of 
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claim issues. "Targeted tender" is not a sound legal doctrine, especially in the workers 
compensation context, and should not be adoptc- i • ^T requests that this Court affirm 
the trial court's order. 
Dated this 12th day of January ,2012 
MES R. BLACK, P.Q 
James R. Black 
Matthew J. Black 
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee Workers 
Compensation Fun 
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ATTACHMENT 1 
De raiivc i \ loneer's Overlapping WCF 
and UBIC workers compenstion policies. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Pioneer Roofing Workers Compensation Policies 
Russell Antone's Accident 
March 21, 2008 
WCF Policy Period 
April 1, 2007 -April 1, 2008 
UBIC Policy Period 
February 22, 2008 - February 22, 2009 
Overlapping Policy Period 
February 22, 2008 -April 1, 2008 
Identical Other-Insurance Clause in Pioneei rs 
WCF and UBIC Contracts 
F. We will not pay more than our share of damages 
and costs covered by this insurance and other 
insurance or self-insurance . . . all shares will be 
equal until the loss is paid. 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-205 
(b) A workers compensation policy is in effect from 
inception until canceled by filing with the 
[Industrial Accidents] division... a notification of 
cancellation in the form prescribed by the division 
within ten days after the cancellation of the policy 
(c) Failure to notify the division . . . results in 
continued liability of the carrier. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ATTACHMENT 2 
Demonslriiliw Pre I\\K\ PosI-Complaint Timeline 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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WCF v. UBIC: Pre- and Post-Complaint Timeline 
September 13, 2010 
UBIC served with 
complaint 
March 10,2010 
WCF informs 
UBIC 
of overlapping 
coverage 
March 
2010 
January 6, 2011 
WCF's first discovery 
requests to UBIC -
request a copy of UBIC 
policy and effective date 
October 13, 2010 
Answer to complaint 
December 3, 2010 
Initial disclosures 
exchanged - no 
copy of UBIC policy 
included 
? 
FuJjiuary 17. 2011 
WCF letter to UBIC 
requesting complete copy 
of the UBIC policy 
(ubrudfy lb, 20! I 
UBIC discovery responses - includes 
only partial copy of the policy. UBIC 
affirms February 22, 2008 as policy 
effective date in response to 
interrogatory no. 1. 
i obnuii :\ 20 11 
UBIC issues reformed 
contract with altered 
effective date*** 
Discovery responses include documents created after service of complaint: 
(1) letters from John Stout to UBIC dated October 8, 2010 and December 16, 2010, 
and (2) January 19, 2011 UBIC internal inquiry on how to reform contract 
March 11,2011 
WCF files motion for 
summary judgment 
= WCF 
= UBIC 
March 
2011 
UBIC supplements 
discovery with copy of 
reformed contract issued 
on February18,2011 
Februar. 
UBIC supplemental disclosures with complete 
copy of policy. No copy of reformed policy 
included. UBIC assures "all 2008 policy 
documents have been produced." 
*** The Labor Commission's records still reflect the original February 22, 2008 effective date of Pioneer's UBIC policy 
because there has been no valid cancellation of the policy as required by UTAH C O D E A N N . § 34A-2-205. 
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